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to	 it	 (especially	 in	2013).	Secondly,	by	negating	the	 legitimacy	of	 the	new	
rules,	 it	has	been	making	efforts	 to	undermine	 them	by	employing	 legal	
instruments	(for	example,	contesting	the	regulations	of	the	third	energy	















traditional	 economic	means	 as	 investments	 in	 assets	 (transmission	 net-
works,	gas	storage	facilities	and	companies	active	on	the	gas	trade	market)	
and	pushing	through	the	implementation	of	new	gas	pipeline	construction	
projects	 (South	Stream	and	potentially	 the	 third	and	 fourth	branches	of	
Nord	Stream).	On	the	other	hand,	the	evolution	of	the	EU	gas	market	has	










changes	 in	 the	 Russian	 gas	 sector	 within	 a	 short	 timeframe.	 Neverthe-












EU.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	very	 likely	 that	 the	Kremlin	will	 try	 to	 capitalise	
































Gas consumption (bcm)3 Volume of gas imported from Russia (bcm)4
2010 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
Germany 83.3 74.5 83.2 88.5 34.02 33.16 40.18
Italy 76.1 71.3 73.4 68.7 17.08 15.08 25.33
United 
Kingdom 99.2 82.8 79.2 79.2 8.16 8.11 12.46
Poland 15.5 15.7 16.3 16.3 10.25 9.94 9.8
France 47.4 40.9 45.6 46.1 9.53 8.04 8.21
Czech 
Republic 9.3 8.4 8.0 8.1 7.59 7.28 7.32



















Gas consumption (bcm)3 Volume of gas imported from Russia (bcm)4
2010 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
Slovakia 5.6 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.89 4.19 5.42
Austria 10.1 9.5 8.9 8.3 5.43 5.22 5.23
Finland 3.9 3.4 3.6 3.4 4.19 3.48 3.56
Bulgaria 2.6 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.81 2.53 2.76
Lithuania 3.1 3.4 3.2 2.6 3.4 3.32 2.7
Greece 3.7 4.5 4.4 3.8 2.9 2.5 2.62
Holland 43.6 38.1 39.5 40.3 4.37 2.31 2.13
Romania 13.6 13.9 13.4 11.6 2.82 2.17 1.19
Latvia 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.25 1.12 1.13
Estonia 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.69 0.64 0.73
Slovenia 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.53 0.5 0.54
Denmark 5.0 4.2 3.5 3.3 0.05 0.33 0.33
Croatia – – 2.9 2.8 – – –






exports	 to	Russia,	 respectively.	 In	 turn,	 as	 regards	European	non-EU	mem-
ber	states,	Turkey,	with	imports	at	26.61	bcm	in	2013	5,	is	a	particularly	impor-
tant	outlet	for	Russian	gas.	According	to	data	published	by	GazpromExport	in	
mid	February	2014,	Russia’s	 share	 in	 the	European	gas	consumption	market	

















































6	 ‘Доля «Газпрома» на рынке Европы достигла исторического максимума’,	Ведомости,	







gate.	 ‘Газпром себя не обделил’,	http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2014/02/15/5908845.sht-
ml	(accessed	on:	16	February	2014).	According	to	media	reports,	Gazprom	invested	around	














I. CHANGES TAKING PLACE ON THE EUROPEAN GAS 
mARKET AND THEIR CONSEqUENCES FOR RUSSIA 
The	evolution	of	the	European	gas	market	covers:	legislative changes (above	
all,	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 so-called	 energy	 packages,	 including	 directives	
and	 regulations	 aimed	 at	 liberalising	 the	EU	 energy	market);	 institutional 
changes (the	 increasing	 significance	 of	 the	 European	 Commission	 as	 re-
gards	enforcement	of	applicable	regulations	in	the	energy	sector,	for	example	
through	 the	use	of	measures	aimed	at	 legal	protection	of	competition	 in	 the	




1. The legal and institutional changes and their consequences  
for Russia 
One	of	 the	most	 serious	 changes	on	 the	EU	gas	market	 are	 the	new	energy 
law regulations, and	in	particular	the	so-called	third	energy	package,	which	
as	yet	includes	three	regulations	and	two	directives9	(and	network	codes	are	









who	 is	 formally	 independent	 from	 the	owner	 (meets	 the	ownership	unbun-


























































































Most	 long-term	 gas	 supply	 contracts	 with	 Gazprom	 will	 expire	 between	
2025	and	2036.	In	turn,	the	contracts	which	regulate	gas	transit	issues	will	
expire	between	2015	and	2025.	The	introduction	of	the	new	gas	trade	model	
will	 force	Gazprom	 to	 reserve	 transport	 capacities	offered	by	operators	on	
auctions	 to	 be	 able	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 long-term	 contracts	 binding	 upon	
















































































occurred	in	Europe:	the	consistent	decrease in own production, increased 
competition and	diversification of	supply	sources	(mainly	LNG).	On	the	oth-
er	hand,	variability in demand for	gas	has	been	observed	over	the	past	few	
years	in	Europe	due	to	the	difficult	economic	situation.	In	addition	to	all	this,	














































2010 2011 2012 2013
Europe
Quantity	 90 90.47 66.75 46.56
Change	in	% +	1 -	26 -	30.25
Asia
Quantity 185.4 211.09 229.85 244.23
Change	in	% +	13.85 +8.8 +6.2
Author’s	calculations	based	on	IGU	World	LNG	Report	–	2013	Edition;	IGU	World	LNG	Report	–	2014	Edition.
Table 3.	Regasification	potential	of	EU	member	states	(as	of	April	2014)

























Country No. of terminals Total regasification capacity (bcm)
Holland 1 12
Portugal 1 7.9













































(up	 to	 585.4	bcm	 in	 the	 case	where	EU	climate	policy	guidelines	are	 rapidly	
implemented)22.
The	decrease	in	demand	for	Russian	gas	in	the	EU	has	for	Russia	been	a	pal-
pable	 consequence	 of	 the	 changes	 on	 the	 EU	market.	 Gazprom	had	 consist-
ently	maintained	its	position	on	the	EU	gas	market,	one	basic	manifestation	of	
which	was	Europe’s	continuing	dependence	on	Russian	gas	imports23.	Russian	









Spring)	and	 in	2013	 (164.24	bcm	 jointly	EU	with	Turkey),	which	 in	 turn	was	
mainly	an	effect	of	the	unusually	cold	winter	in	the	2012/2013	season,	a	tem-











ing	a	record-high	level	of	60%	in	2007.	S.	V.	Zhukov	(ed.),	‘Глобализация рынка природного 
газа: возможности и вызовы для России’,	IMEMO	RAN,	Moscow	2010,	pages	68-87.	
24	 ‘Экспорт российского газа: ограничения и перспективы’, Центр макроэкономического 















The	gas trade rules on	the	European	market	have	also	been	evolving.	Long-



























































against	 the	Czech	 company	RWE	Transgas.	Gazprom	claimed	 that	 its	Czech	
contractor	had	 to	pay	US$500	million	 for	 receiving	 less	 gas	 than	 contracted	
in	 2008–2011. This	decision	 set	 a	precedent	 –	 it	was	 the	first	 time	when	 the	
court	ruled	that	a	unilateral	waiver	of	the	‘take	or	pay’	clause	did	not	constitute	
breach	of	 contract.	One	 indirect	 consequence	of	 the	arbitration	proceedings	
is	the	reinforcement	of	European	gas	companies’	negotiating	position,	which	
insist	 that	 the	 long-term	contracts	 signed	with	Gazprom,	and	especially	 the	
provisions	concerning	the	price	policy,	need	to	be	revised.	The	unfavourable	
court	decisions	have	undermined	Gazprom’s	position	in	other	arbitration	cases	






























the	 gas	 contracts	 already	 in	 force.	 In	 turn,	 the	more	 flexible	 interpretation	
of	 the	 ‘take	or	pay’	clause	–	one	of	 the	pillars	of	Gazprom’s	contract	policy	–	

















II. THE RUSSIAN STRATEGy IN RESPONSE TO THE CHANGES 
TAKING PLACE ON THE EUROPEAN GAS mARKET 
One	of	the	strategic	goals	as	part	of	Russian	energy	policy	is	to	maintain,	and	
if	 possible	 reinforce,	 its	 position	 as	 a	 gas	 supplier	 to	 Europe.	 Emphasising	
more	often	than	before	the	significance	of	expansion	on	Asian	markets	and	


















Russia has reacted to the changes taking place on the European gas mar-



































of	 a	 certain	 evolution	 of	 the	Russian	 strategy,	 suggesting	 at	 least	 a	 partial	
adjustment	to	the	changing	market	reality	(price	discounts	for	European	gas	
recipients).	







part	of	the	liberalisation	of	the	EU	gas	market.	Critical rhetoric with regard 





































required	 to	 receive	 prior	 consent	 from	 the	 federal	 government	 of	 the	 Rus-
sian	Federation	in	three	cases:	(1)	disclosure	of	information	concerning	their	
business	upon	request	 from	authorities	of	other	 countries,	 international	or-















37	 Vladimir	Putin,	‘Россия и меняющийся мир’,	Московские новости,	27	February	2012.	
38	 ‘В “Газпроме” считают расследование ЕК против него попыткой давления’, http://
ria.ru/economy/20130530/940329650.html	 (accessed	 on:	 8	 May	 2014);	 ‘Путин назвал 















The	 decree	 did	 not	 prevent	 the	 European	 Commission	 from	 continuing	 the	
proceedings.	However,	the	fact	that	it	was	passed	revealed	Gazprom’s	lack	of	
















lected	EU	member	 states	 (agreements	 concerning	 the	 construction	of	 South	






Another	 political	measure	 in	 regular	 use	 is	making	 unilateral	 declarations	
suggesting	 that	 Russia	 is	 interested	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 previously	
























out	 the	need	 to	revive	 the	project	envisaging	 the	construction	of	 the	second	
branch	of	the	Yamal-Europe	gas	pipeline42.	Such	moves	are	aimed	primarily	
at	provoking	political	discussions	in	the	countries	which	the	projects	concern	
and	 at	 creating	 a	 sort	 of	 information	 noise	which	 stresses	 the	 difference	 of	
opinions	between	individual	EU	member	states.	
1.2. Investments	in	the	gas	storage	and	trade	segment
Another	constant	element	in	Gazprom’s	strategy	is	the	desire to reinforce its 




































































44	 In	 addition	 to	 gas	 storage	 facilities	 in	 EU	 countries,	 Gazprom	 also	 has	 one	 in	 Banatski	
Dvor,	 Serbia.	 This	 gas	 storage	 has	 a	 capacity	 of	 around	 0.45	 billion	m3,	 and	 is	 51%	 con-
trolled	by	Gazprom.	 ‘Газпром удвоит мощности по хранению газа в Европе’,	http://rbc-
daily.ru/industry/562949980275426	(accessed	on	20	March	2014); ‘Газпром запустил под 

















Country Storage facility Capacity (bcm) Gazprom’s share































thermore,	while	 in	 2009	 the	price	 in	Gazprom’s	 long-term	contracts	was	on	
average	around	70%	higher	 than	 the	 spot	market	prices,	 in	 2013	 it	was	only	
5–6%	higher.	 In	the	opinion	of	Howard	Rogers	 from	Oxford	Institute	 for	En-
ergy	Studies,	Gazprom	could	influence	the	prices	by	increasing	its	share	in	the	
spot	market47.	Therefore,	it	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	investments	in	gas	storage	
























tion	on	the	European	market	is	increasing the transport capacity by build-










Herzegovina.	 Austria	 recently	 declared	 once	 again	 its	 intention	 to	 join	
the	 project.	 The	 representatives	 of	 Gazprom	 and	 Austria’s	 OMV	 signed	
a	memorandum	to	this	effect	on	29	April	2014	in	Moscow,	and	sharehold-
ers	 of	 South	Stream	Austria	GmbH	 signed	 an	 agreement	 envisaging	 the	
construction	of	 the	Austrian	section	of	South	Stream	on	24	 June	2014	 in	
Vienna50.	The	management	of	Gazprom	are	still	interested	in	the	further	
development	of	the	Nord	Stream	gas	pipeline,	declaring	that	its	possible	
third	 and	 fourth	 branches	 could	 be	used	primarily	 for	 supplying	 gas	 to	
the	British	market.	
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 analysis	 of	 gas	 supplies	 contracted	 and	 the	 existing	
available	 transport	 capacities	 suggests	 that	 the	Russian	policy	 is	 economi-
cally	 irrational.	However,	 in	 the	 longer	 run,	 increasing	 transport	 capacity	
may	constitute	a	successful	means	for	partially	resolving	the	legal	problems	
existing	in	Russia-EU	relations.	This	may	also	enable	Russia	to	influence	the	




mit	up	 to	32	bcm	of	Russian	gas	annually	 (a	 transport	capacity	at	 this	 level	 is	planned	 to	
be	achieved	 in	 January	2018).	 ‘«Газпром» и Австрия отметили актуальность создания 
альтернативных маршрутов поставок российского газа в Европу’,	http://www.gazprom.








































51	 The	deputy	president	 of	Gazprom,	Alexander	Medvedev,	 announced	on	 2	March	2014	 in	


































































































Seeing	 the	attempts	 taken	by	some	EU	countries	 to	 implement	shale	gas	ex-

























(claiming	 that	 the	use	of	 the	hydraulic	 fracturing	method	will	have	a	major	






























59	 John	 Daly,	 ‘Russia	 Behind	 Bulgarian	 Anti-Fracking	 Protests?’,	 4	 February	 2012,	 http://
oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Russia-Behind-Bulgarian-Anti-Fracking-Protests.
html	(accessed	on:	10	May	2014).




































































the	 right	 to	export	gas	via	 the	pipeline	 system	 to	 the	 so-called	 independent	























pants	with	the	right	to	export	gas	using	the	pipeline	system.	‘Роснефть предложила план 
























































68	 ‘Основные положения проекта энергетической стратегии России на период до 2035 года’,	
http://minenergo.gov.ru/documents/razrabotka/17481.html	(accessed	on:	23	January	2014).	
69	 Szymon	 Kardaś,	 ‘The	 creeping	 ‘de-Gazpromisation’	 of	 Russian	 exports’,	 OSW Analyses,	















projects in an attempt to catch up with other countries active in this sec-





similar	 significance	 to	 Europe	 as	 an	 export	 destination.	 This	 has	 been	 con-
firmed	by	both	the	guidelines	adopted	as	part	of	the	LNG	projects	in	progress	
(Novatek,	Total	and	CNPC	as	part	of	the	Yamal-LNG	project	or	Gazprom’s	plans	





Project name Key shareholder from Russia
Launch date Production capacity(bcm)
Initial / ultimate
Sakhalin-2 Gazprom 2012	 15	/	20.7
Vladivostok-LNG Gazprom 2018 6.9	/	20.7
Baltic-LNG Gazprom 2020 4.1	/	4.1
Sakhalin-1 Rosneft 2018 6.9	/	13.8

































ture	 guaranteed	 to	 other,	 competitive,	 Russian	 gas	 firms,	 combined	 with	
restructuring	 of	 Gazprom,	might	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 contribute	 to	 resolving	
the	legal	problems	in	gas	relations	between	Russia	and	the	EU	(the	possible	
split	of	Gazprom	into	separate	companies	in	charge	of	gas	production,	tran-














































France GDF	Suez 17	January	2012 10–15%




























с Газпромом о снижении цены на газ’,	http://1prime.ru/gas/20140508/784473530.html	(ac-
cessed	on:	8	May	2014).


































































































Average annual gas price (US$)
2011 2012 2013
Lithuania 397 520 480
Greece 414 475 469
Slovakia 333 428 438
Poland 420 433 429
Latvia 397 440 420
Estonia 397 440 420
Hungary 383 416 418
France 399 398 404
Austria 387 394 402
Czech	Republic 419 500 400
77	 	Arbitration	proceedings	were	launched,	for	example,	by	Poland’s	PGNiG	in	February	2012	
in	 order	 to	 be	 granted	 a	 price	 discount.	 Finally,	 a	 business	 compromise	was	 reached	 in	



















Average annual gas price (US$)
2011 2012 2013
Holland 366 346 400
Italy 410 438 399
Slovenia 377 400 396
Bulgaria 356 435 394
Romania 390 424 387
Denmark 480 394 382
Finland 358 373 367
Germany 379 353 366
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in	principle,	with	a	few	exceptions78,	it is not willing to accept proposals to 
change the price formula which	envisage	 that	gas	prices	will	no	 longer	be	
based	on	 the	prices	of	 crude	oil	 and	petroleum	products	and	 instead	be	 ref-
erenced	 to	 spot	market	 prices.	 Gazprom’s	 representatives	 have	 argued	 that	
the	volatility	of	prices	on	the	spot	markets	adversely	affects	the	certainty	of	
78	 One	 example	 is	 the	modification	 of	 the	 price	 formula	 in	 contracts	with	 recipients	 from	
North-Western	Europe,	above	all	with	Holland’s	Gas	Terra	(in	autumn	2011,	45%	of	the	price	
formula	was	based	on	spot	market	prices).	On	average,	Gazprom	accepts	the	share	of	spot	




















force	Gazprom	 to	 adjust	 its	 trade	 policy.	 The	 evolution	 of	 the	market	 situ-
























79	 ‘Клиенты Газпрома добиваются смягчения условий’, Ведомости,	15	October	2012,	http://
www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/4998891/ne_beri_i_ne_plati	 (accessed	 on:	 8	 May	
2014);	‘Газпром согласился увеличить зависимость от спотового рынка газа’,	Ведомости,	
4	 July	 2014,	 http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/28561971/gazprom-narushil-tabu	
(accessed	on:	10	July	2014).	































Gazprom’s	 long-standing	 resistance	 to	 actions	 taken	by	 the	Lithuanian	gov-
ernment	had	to	be	discontinued	when	its	previous	ally,	the	German	company	






82	 Lithuania	 sets	 gas	 unbundling	 deadline	 for	October	 2014,	 http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2011/10/28/lithuania-gas-unbundling-idUSL5E7LS0YQ20111028	
83	 For	more	see:	Joanna	Hyndle-Hussein,	‘Gazprom	sells	off	its	assets	in	Lithuania’,	OSW Analy­














III. SCENARIOS FOR THE DEVELOPmENT OF GAS RELATIONS 













operating	on	 its	 internal	market	 comply	with	EU	energy	 law.	Liberalisation	
aimed	at	improving	competitiveness	on	the	EU	market	and	also	the	desire	to	






The	 announcement	 of	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 European	 Commission’s	 antitrust	




























sia,	 the	 process	 of	 building	 a	 symmetric	 energy	 inter-dependence	 between	
the	EU	and	Russia	would	be	 reinforced.	 Firstly,	Moscow	would	find	 it	more	
















































































































been	 considered	 especially	 intensively	 in	Europe	over	 the	past	 few	months.	
In	the	opinion	of	certain	sections	among	the	European	elite,	this	source	could	
be	 viewed	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 Russian	 supplies.	 Regardless	 of	 the	 political	
86	 According	to	forecasts,	it	will	be	able	to	export	even	30-35	billion	m3	of	gas	in	2020.	‘Иран 



















liquefied	natural	 gas	 from	 the	USA	 to	Europe	within	 the	next	 three	or	 four	
years.	This	 is	a	matter	of	 legal	 (US	companies	are	required	 to	obtain	export	
licences),	technical	(the	first	LNG	export	terminals	will	be	ready	in	2015	and	
2017,	and	most	of	them	only	by	around	2020),	and	often	purely	economic	as-
pects.	A	comparison	of	gas	production	and	consumption	 forecasts	 in	 the	US	










4. The lack of cohesion in EU member states’ energy policy with 






from	 developing	 their	 intensive	 and	 comprehensive	 economic	 co-operation	
89	 In	2013,	 the	average	price	of	US	gas	stood	at	US$133.6	per	 1000	m3,	 i.e.	 it	grew	by	around	
34.8%	in	comparison	to	the	preceding	year.	The	average	price	of	liquefied	natural	gas	sup-
plied	to	Japan	from	Indonesia	reached	around	US$627.2	per	1000	m3.	For	comparison,	the	
price	of	Russian	gas	on	 the	border	with	Germany	was	US$402	per	 1000	m3,	and	 the	spot	




























not	only	 in	 the	gas	sector	but	also	 in	 the	nuclear	sector	 (preliminary	agree-
ments	concerning	the	development	of	the	Hungarian	nuclear	power	plant	in	












































The	mutual	 dependence	 of	 Russia	 and	Europe	 in	 the	 energy	 sector	 is	 set	 to	










































































Existing LNG terminals (present import capacity in bcm)
LNG terminals under construction (planned import capacity in bcm)
Gas storage facilities under construction for eventual use by Gazprom
Existing gas pipelines used by Gazprom





Existing gas storage facilities used by Gazprom
Zeebrugge (9)
Rotterdam (12)
Isle of Grain (19,5) 
Teesside (4,6)
Milford Haven (21+7,6)



















































































Existing LNG terminals (present import capacity in bcm)
LNG terminals under construction (planned import capacity in bcm)
Gas storage facilities under construction for eventual use by Gazprom
Existing gas pipelines used by Gazprom





Existing gas storage facilities used by Gazprom
Zeebrugge (9)
Rotterdam (12)
Isle of Grain (19,5) 
Teesside (4,6)
Milford Haven (21+7,6)
Montoir de Bretagne (10)
Dunkirk (13)
Fos -Tonkin (5,5)
Fos-Cavaou (8,25)
Barcelona (17,1)
Sagunto (8,8)
Bilbao (7)Gijon (7)
Mugardos (3,6)
Huelva (11,8)
Sines (7,9)
New Cartagena (11,8)
Revithousa (5,3)
Panigaglia (3,4)
Livorno (3,75)
Toscana offshore (3,75)
Świnoujście (7,5)
Klaipeda (4)
Rovigo (7,56)
